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Abstract: Using the classical Hotelling model, this paper analyzes the incentive for a 
CATV service provider to bundle broadband internet services when entering the 
broadband internet services market. In addition, the effect of such service bundling by an 
entrant on the market incumbent with ownership over existing bottleneck facilities is 
analyzed. Furthermore, an access charge that maximizes social welfare is explored and 
determined. Two cases are considered: in the first case, the market is fully covered; and in 
the second case, the market is not fully covered. With full market coverage, an entrant has 
an incentive for service bundling if there is sufficient service differentiation. The entrant's 
bundling strategy reduces the incumbent's profit. In this case, the total social welfare is 
independent of the level of the access charge and only has an effect of redistributing the 
net surplus between consumers and the incumbent. With partial market coverage, the 
entrant has an incentive for service bundling at a low access charge. The incumbent's 
profit increases if the access charge is higher than the cost of access provisioning. In this 
case, the total social welfare is dependent on the level of access charge and the welfare 
maximizing access charge is less than the unit cost of providing access. 
Key words: cable TV; broadband internet service; bundling; access charge; convergence. 
 
ith the rapid growth of information and telecommunications 
technologies, the process of convergence between media and 
telecommunications service industries is accelerating. Many 
predictions in the 1990s on "telephone company entry into cable television" 
(JOHNSON, 1993) and "cable TV entry into telephony" (KIM, 1996) have 
already been fulfilled. Such convergence between media and 
telecommunications services demonstrates that competitive forces from 
other industries can crowd into a once monopolistic market. 
                     
(*) We wish to thank and acknowledge Prof. Jae-Hyeon AHN of KAIST Graduate School of 
Information & Media Management for his critical comments and support throughout the entire 
development process of this paper. 
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The entrance of cable TV companies into the telecommunications 
services market is one such example. In the Republic of Korea, System 
Operators (SOs), who had been providing only cable TV service to their local 
areas, have recently begun to provide bundled high-speed internet access 
services, utilizing their cable TV network infrastructure. However, in order to 
provide local areas with broadband internet services 1, SOs need access to 
various facilities belonging to incumbent telecommunications firms, including 
backbone networks, ducts, poles, conduits, and right of way. In response to 
the SO's swift penetration into the internet service market (Electronic Times, 
2003), incumbent internet service providers (major telcos) have been trying 
to increase usage fees for bottleneck facilities 2. In return, SO's have been 
accusing the incumbent providers of antitrust behavior. Under such 
circumstances, a governmental policy on access and access charges for 
bottleneck facilities is of focal interest. 
One major issue that has not been clearly taken up is the impact of 
service bundling on the competitive behavior of the firms involved. As in the 
above example, an entrant's bundling strategy of leveraging its monopoly 
power in another market is likely to conflict with an incumbent's defending 
strategy of restricting access to components that are essential to 
competitors. According to the leverage theory, a monopolist in a particular 
market can dominate a second market by leveraging its monopoly power, 
thereby weakening fair competition in the second market. However, this 
leverage theory has been criticized by many, including POSNER (1976), 
BORK (1978), and SCHMALENSEE (1982). It has been argued that 
although a monopoly firm in a particular market can extend its monopoly 
power by bundling in another perfectly competitive market, this firm cannot 
increase its own profit by doing so. In this case, bundling has been regarded 
as a tool for price discrimination instead of as an anti-competitive behavior. 
In contrast to this criticism, there are several recent studies claiming that 
bundling may exclude competition and affect firms' profit and welfare levels. 
WHINSTON (1990) and CARLTON & WALDMAN (2002) point out that if a 
monopolistic firm in one market is also an incumbent in another market with 
                     
1 In particular, most rights of way and facilities such as ducts, poles, and conduits belong to a 
leading Korean telecommunications service firm, which also provides internet access service 
using xDSL technology. 
2 Incumbent providers also accuse SOs of breach of contract. In particular, they argue that SOs 
should not provide high-speed internet access service using their essential facilities, since the 
original contract specifies that only a cable TV service will be provided via these essential 
facilities. 
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an oligopoly structure, tying can exclude the entry of potential competitors, 
by extending the firm's monopoly power. CARBAJO et al. (1990) and 
DENICOLO (2000) suggest that bundling can be utilized as a strategic 
device for product differentiation and market segmentation, resulting in a 
relaxation of price competition. Moreover, such a strategic bundling can 
contribute to enhanced profitability 3.  
In our opinion, however, even if SO's are monopolistic in their local cable 
TV market, they are in a relatively weak position in the broadband internet 
market in that they must utilize an incumbent's essential facilities for 
broadband internet service provisioning. This situation is a typical example 
of a one-way access model. ARMSTRONG (1998) defines one-way access 
as "a setting where a firm monopolizes an input or group of inputs which is 
needed by all firms". In such a case, "there is the obvious danger that a 
network operator controlling key inputs will seek to exclude competitors by 
setting a high access price" (ARMSTRONG et al., 1996). Thus, regulation 
with regard to access charges is required to ensure socially desirable results 
(ARMSTRONG, 1998; LAFFONT & TIROLE, 2000). 
To address these market conditions, this paper develops a simple 
duopoly model, in which an entrant competes with an incumbent by offering 
a bundled service, while utilizing a one-way access that the incumbent 
possesses. Our model setting is similar to that of WHINSTON (1990), with 
two key differences. Firstly, while a monopolistic firm in a market is an 
incumbent in the other market in Whinston's model, our model assumes a 
setting where a monopolistic firm in one market is an entrant in a new 
market. Secondly, the aforementioned one-way access setting is 
incorporated. 
Most analyses utilizing the Hotelling location competition model have 
assumed full market coverage (WHINSTON, 1990; ARMSTRONG, 1998; 
FOROS et al.. 2001). In other words, these analyses implicitly assumed that 
consumers' valuation for services offered by the market were sufficiently 
high enough that all consumers subscribe to one service or the other. Under 
this assumption, profits and market shares of two firms are dependent upon 
the price differential. Thus, an interaction between two firms is explicitly 
incorporated in the model. In contrast, when the market is not fully covered, 
each firm behaves monopolistically within its respective local market. In this 
case, an interaction between two firms via price diffential is not explicitly 
                     
3 Refer to CHOI (2004) for a summary of research issues and results on leverage of tying. 
76   No. 63, 3rd Q. 2006 
present. On the other hand, since an entrant must have an access to an 
incumbent's essential facilities, an explicit interaction between two firms via a 
one-way access charge is present in both cases. 
Our model can be applied to a number of other telecommunications and 
media convergence contexts. For example, CATV SO's are also entering the 
voice telephony market with the upcoming VOIP service as part of their 
"triple service" plan along with the aforementioned broadband internet 
service. Following a similar logic to the broadband internet service market 
case, entrant SO's need to pay an access charge to incumbent telcos; the 
determination of the level of this access charge and its impact is a focal 
policy issue.  
As another example, a Korean mobile carrier has just launched a service 
enabling subscribers to the mobile service to initiate or receive voice calls at 
the wireline telephony rate when these calls are initiated or received in the 
vicinity of their wireline telephone terminal. In this case, the mobile carrier is 
bundling its wireless telephony service with an additional cheapter mobile – 
wireline telephony service, in which case the mobile carrier needs to pay the 
access charge to the wireline service carrier. Consequently, the wireline 
carrier is in direct competition with the mobile carrier in its market due to the 
mandated interconnection duty imposed on the wireline carrier. Since the 
launch of this service in 2006, the determination of the level of access 
charge for both inbound and outbound calls for this mobile carrier, and 
eventually, the level of access charge for all telecommunications services, 
has been an active policy issue in the Korean telecommunications market 
(MUNHWAILBO, 2006). 
In this paper, along with a model for bundling incentives, the following 
issues are addresed. Firstly, we explore whether there is an incentive to 
enter a broadband internet access market by bundling, and, if so, under 
what conditions these incentives exist. In addition, we explore how a cable 
TV provider's penetration into the market by bundling affects the incumbent. 
We subsequently examine how social welfare is affected by the level of the 
access charge for bottleneck facilities and determine an optimal level of 
access charge for maximizing social welfare. 
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  The model 
Suppose there are two independent markets, market 1(M1) and market 
2(M2), where market 1 is a cable TV service market, and market 2 is a 
broadband internet service market. Let firm 1 be a monopolistic cable TV 
service provider in market 1 and firm 2 be an incumbent internet service 
provider in market 2. Firm 1 considers entering market 2. 
For convenience, the size of the potential consumer pool is normalized to 
1. Suppose that half of the potential consumer pool place high reservation 
value ( Hv ) on the cable TV service, and the other half place a low 
reservation value ( Lv ) on the cable TV service, where L Hv v< . Firm 1 
faces a constant marginal cost, 1Mc  where 1M Lc v< . Clearly, firm 1's profit 
is 1( ) / 2H Mv c−  at price Hv  and 1( )L Mv c−  at price Lv . For simplicity, we 
assume that 1 1( ) / 2 ( )H M L Mv c v c− ≥ − , in which case the best pricing 
strategy of firm 1 in market 1 is to set the cable TV service price at Hv . 
In market 2, firm 2 is an incumbent broadband internet service provider, 
and firm 1 is a potential entrant. These two firms compete a la Hotelling in 
market 2. We denote the location of a consumer on a unit interval by x , [ ]0,1x∈ , in which consumers are uniformly distributed. Suppose firm 1 is 
located at 1 0x =  and firm 2 at 2 1x = . Broadband internet service offerings 
of the two firms are assumed to provide the same value of 2Mv . However, a 
consumer x  is charged a transportation cost of it x x−  when subscribing 
to the service offered by the firm with location ix , 1,2i = . This 
transportation cost represents disutility from the discrepancy between a 
firm's service and the most preferred service by a consumer. 
Following CARTER & WRIGHT (1999), we assume that firm 2 has an 
incumbent advantage due to first-mover advantages and brand loyalty by 
adding a term ix tβ  ( 1,2i = , 0 1β≤ ≤ ) to the consumers' utility function, as 
in [1]. As a result of this term, a consumer located at x  is shifted towards the 
location of firm 2 by β . When 0β = , market 2 is characterized as 
symmetric competition, whereas when 1β = , consumers located at 1x  may 
prefer firm 2's service, even although the prices of the two services are the 
same. 
Let's assume that firm i  charges customers with price ip . Then the 
utility of a consumer located at x who would subscribe to firm i 's internet 
service is represented as: 
2i M i i iU v t x x x t pβ= − − + −   1,2i = , 1 0x = , 2 1x =   [1] 
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Firm 2 possesses bottleneck facilities to which firm 1 must have an 
access for service provision. Let c  denote firm 2's cost of managing and 
repairing its bottleneck network facilities, and let a  be the access charge 
imposed upon firm 1 per unit demand, which is imposed by regulation. In 
addition, there is a general cost such as general management, sales and 
administration, database management, and advertising for the two firms, 
which is denoted by 2Mc . Thus, the total unit cost of operating in market 2 
for firm 2 is 2Mc c+  and that for firm 1 is 2Mc a+ . In this environment, firm 
1's bundled service provides consumers with two options: consumers may 
purchase the cable TV service only, or they may purchase the bundled 
service 4. On the other hand, if firm 1 chooses not to offer a bundled service, 
firm 1 will offer the broadband internet service in market 2 independent of 
market 1 5. Table 1 summarizes model variables and parameters present in 
this paper. 
Due to significant differences in the results of the analysis, the business 
environment is categorized into two cases according to whether the market 
is fully covered or not. Full market coverage refers to the case in which the 
sum of consumers with positive utility, i.e., ( ) 0,iU x i≥ =  1,2, is higher than 
1. On the other hand, the partial market coverage case corresponds to the 
situation where the sum of consumers with positive utility is less than 1. This 
definition of full and partial market coverage cases leads to restrictions on 
model parameters which we refer to as "market coverage condition".  
In addition, we place additional assumptions of "non-negative market 
share conditions" for players 1 and 2 in order to further specify the range of 
the model parameters. These technical assumptions are fully developed in 
the annex 6 for both the full and the partial market coverage cases, which 
are assumed to hold for respective scenario. 
                     
4 Note that consumers cannot subscribe to the broadband internet access service without the 
cable TV service from firm 1. Therefore, our model can be regarded as a partial mixed bundling 
model. Accordingly, if consumers have already subscribed to firm 1's cable TV and need an 
internet access service, they can either purchase firm 1's bundled service or subscribe to firm 
1's cable TV service and firm 2's broadband internet access service. 
5 Here, we are considering the situation whereby a cable TV service provider enters the 
broadband internet service market and provides its existing cable TV subscribers with the 
choice of bundled service. Consequently, the case in which consumers can subscribe only to 
firm 1's broadband internet service is excluded. This modeling assumption emphasizes the 
cable TV service provider's strategy of leveraging the monopoly power of its existing cable TV 
market. 
6 The annex is available on C&S website: www.comstrat.org 
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Table 1 - Model variables and parameters 
Hv  High reservation price of consumers in market 1 
Lv  Low reservation price of consumers in market 1 
2Mv  Reservation price of consumers in market 2 
x  Location of a consumer or a firm in market 2 
t  Disutilify associated with a unit distance between a consumer 
and his/her ideal service in market 2 
β  Extent of consumer loyalty towards firm 2 in market 2 
1Mc  Firm 1's constant marginal cost in market 1 
c  firm 2's maintenance cost of  bottleneck network facilities 
a  access charge imposed upon firm 1 per unit demand 
2Mc  general managenet cost in market 2 for both firms 
, 1,2i iα =  Market share of firm i 
1
WBp  Firm 1's price of bundled service in market 2 
2
WBp  Firm 2's price in market 2 
1
HU  ( 1
LU ) Net utility of subscribers of the bundled service with reservation 
price of Hv  ( Lv ) 
*, 1,2WBi iΠ =  Firm i's optimal profit when firm 1 bundles 
*, 1,2WOBi iΠ =  Firm i's optimal profit when firm 1 does not bundle 
, 1,2WBiCS i =  Consumer surplus for firm i when firm 1 bundles 
, 1,2WOBiCS i =  Consumer surplus for firm i when firm 1 does not bundle 
  Full market coverage case 
This section analyzes firm 1's incentive for service bundling in market 2, 
its effect on firm 1, and the welfare-maximizing access charge in a case 
where there is full market coverage. In doing so, the profit levels under 
various strategies of the entrant are compared, and conditions under which 
the entrant has the incentive for service bundling are derived. Derivations of 
equilibrium price, profit levels bundling incentives and social welfare results 
for both full and partial market coverage cases are supplied in annex 7. 
                     
7 See: www.comstrat.org 
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Incentive for service bundling and the effect on the incumbent 
Firm 1 will offer bundled service when 1 1* * 0
WB WOBΠ −Π ≥  which 
translates into the condition of 1)3( φβ ≥−t  8. 
We remark that firm 1's incentive for bundling is independent of the level 
of access charge. Even if the level of access charge is above the marginal 
cost of providing it, c , firm 1 is not affected by an increase in the access 
charge. This is due to the fact that under full market coverage case, both 
firms' optimal pricing decision in the presence of an access charge 
compared to the case without an access charge is to increase the service 
price by the amount of the access charge. Moreover, the entrant's demand 
level is dependent only on the price differential between the incumbent and 
the entrant, not on the absolute level of respective service's price regardless 
of whether the entrant bundles or not. In this case, since both players' 
optimal pricing in the presence of an access charge is to increase the 
respective service price by the amount of the access charge, the price 
differential between two firms will be the same regardless of the level of 
access charge, thereby leaving the entrant's profit level unaffected by the 
level of the access charge in both bundling and no-bundling cases. For this 
reason, the entrant's incentive to bundle is independent of the level of the 
access charge under full market coverage condition. Of course, this result 
holds assuming that the level of access charge is set so that full market 
coverage condition is maintained. On the other hand, the incumbent's profit, 
regardless of whether the entrant bundles or not, is directly proportional to 
the level of the access charge.  
Moreover, when consumers' disutility from being remote from their ideal 
service (as reflected by a higher t ), the bundling incentive condition 
becomes easier to satisfy. A higher service differentiation in market 2 leads 
to a higher incentive for service bundling by firm 1. When a monopolistic firm 
in one market enters another market, a lower substitutability (higher 
differentiation) between the two firm's services makes the entrant's bundling 
a more effective way to leverage its monopoly power in another market.  
We now turn our attention to the effect of the entrant's bundling strategy 
on the incumbent firm's profit, given a fixed level of access charge,a , by 
considering the profit differential between cases with and without bundling. 
                     
8 Annex – available on C&S website – contains detailed derivation and variable specifications 
for this and following results. See: www.comstrat.org 
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We show that firm 1's bundling strategy always reduces firm 2's profit, i.e., 
0*2
*
2 <Π−Π WOBWB . These findings are summarized in proposition 1. 
Proposition 1. Entrant's incentive for bundling and its impact  
on the incumbent's profit under full market coverage 
- The entrant's profit and incentive for service bundling are independent 
of the level of access charge imposed by the incumbent; 
- The more differentiated the broadband internet access service is, the 
more likely the entrant will prefer a bundling strategy; 
- The entrant's bundling strategy always reduces the incumbent's 
profits. 
Social welfare 
Let consumer surplus for firm 1 and firm 2 be 1
WOBCS  and 2
WOBCS , 
respectively, when firm 1 does not undertake bundling strategy. Then, 
 
 
1
WBCS  and 2
WBCS , the consumer surplus for firm 1 and firm 2 when firm 1 
adopts a bundling strategy, are derived in the similar way. With some 
algebraic manipulation, we can easily show that regardless of firm 1's 
strategy, the total consumer surplus has the form of a− + a constant term 
where the constant term is independent of the level of access charge. 
The total social welfare can now be derived by combining the consumer 
surplus and the industry profit. We denote the total social welfare of the two 
cases by WOBW  and WBW  9. It is observable that the total social welfare is 
not dependent on the level of access charge, as long as the full market 
coverage condition is satisfied. However, the level of the access charge 
redistributes the total surplus between consumers and the incumbent. The 
decrease in the total consumer surplus from a higher access charge is 
directly translated into an increase in the incumbent's profit. 
                     
9 Actual expressions are specified in the annex. See: www.comstrat.org 
* 1
1 2 1 2 2 20 *
( ) , ( (1 ) )
xWOB WOB
M Mx
CS v tx p dx CS v t x t p dxβ= − − = − − + −∫ ∫
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Proposition 2. Welfare results under full market coverage 
- The total social welfare is independent of the level of the access 
charge when the full market coverage condition is satisfied;  
- A change in the level of the access charge redistributes the surplus 
between the consumers and the incumbent. 
  Partial market coverage case 
When market 2 is not fully covered, the market shares of firm 1 and firm 2 
are determined by the number of consumers with the net utility 0iU ≥ . 
Thus, the market shares of firm 1 and 2 are 1 1 1 *s xα = =  and 
2 2 21 *s xα = = − 10. 
In this case, note that the two firms possess local monopoly power within 
their own markets. Consequently, a small change in one firm's price does 
not affect the other firm's demand. 
Incentive for service bundling and the effect on the incumbent 
Firm 1 has an incentive for service bundling if and only if 
1 1* ( ) *( ) 0
WB WOBa aΠ −Π ≥ . We can easily show that service bundling is 
profitable for the entrant if 2 2 3( )M Ma v c φ≤ − − . 
When the market is not fully covered, the access charge becomes an 
important factor determining the incentive for service bundling. Specifically, a 
higher access charge imposed by the incumbent discourages the bundling 
incentive of the entrant. An economic intuition behind this difference in the 
important factor for bundling incentive under full and partial market coverage 
cases is the following: when the market is partially covered, each firm 
behaves as a local monopolist. In this case, due to the the access charge 
that the entrant has to pay the incumbent, the profit of each firm is directly 
influenced by the level of access charge, unlike the full market coverage 
case. A low level of access charge directly translates into a low cost of 
providing the broadband internet service for the entrant. It follows that, since 
the cost of providing the bundled service is cheaper than the sum of cost of 
                     
10 For definitions of 1 2,s s , please consult the annex: www.comstrat.org 
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each service separately provided by respective firms, the entrant can induce 
consumers with low value for CATV service to subscribe to the bundled 
service, thereby increasing its profit. 
In contrast to the case of full market coverage, the incumbent's profit 
increases as the access charge increases. The price reduction by the 
entrant, in accordance with its bundling strategy, does not affect demand for 
the incumbent's service, since market 2 is locally monopolized. On the other 
hand, the increased demand for the entrant's service, due to the price 
reduction, increases the incumbent's revenue from the access charge 
imposed by it. Consequently, if the access charge is set above the cost, the 
incumbent's profit increases because of the entrant's service bundling. 
Proposition 3. Entrant's incentive for bundling and its impact on the 
incumbent's profit under partial market coverage 
- The entrant has an incentive to bundle services when the access 
charge imposed by the incumbent is sufficiently low due to the fact that a 
low access charge directly translates into a low operating cost for the 
entrant under partial market coverage case; 
- If the access charge is set above the cost of operating the essential 
facilities, the entrant's bundling strategy enhances the incumbent's 
profitability. 
Social welfare 
In contrast with the full market coverage case, the level of total social 
welfare depends on the level of the access charge when the market is not 
fully covere 11 This total social welfare is maximized at 
*
WOBa without 
bundling and at *WBa with bundling. 
From figure 1, notice that the total social welfare is maximized at the 
point where the level of access charge is below the cost c  associated with 
the operation and management of the essential facilities. 
                     
11 See the annex for all expressions: www.comstrat.org 
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Figure 1 – Social welfare as a function of level of access charge 
*
Ba
*
noa c
( )BSW a ( )noSW a
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Proposition 4. Welfare results under partial market coverage 
- As the access charge increases, the total social welfare first increases 
and then decreases after reaching the maximum at a certain level of the 
access charge; 
- The access charge corresponding to the maximum level of social 
welfare is at the level below the unit cost of providing the access. 
In practice, one cannot force an incumbent to set the access charge at a 
level below the provisioning cost c  for many reasons. One possible solution 
might be to set the access charge at the level of cost c . From figure 1, the 
social welfare function is maximized when the level of access charge is c  in 
the range of [ , )a c∈ ∞ . Such a cost-based pricing rule is widely accepted in 
the context of one-way interconnection and access provision. Another 
approach is to offer a subsidy in exchange for the incumbent's profitability 
loss. A similar observation and argument was made by ARMSTRONG 
(1998). 
  Summary and conclusion 
The competition between cable TV service providers and 
telecommunications firms is the central force shaping the outlook of the 
convergence era. The broadband internet service market is one prime 
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example among many service segments in which these two players 
compete. This paper analyzes the incentive for a cable TV service provider 
to enter a broadband internet service market. Cases in which the broadband 
internet market is covered and is not covered are considered, with the focus 
on the existence of a bundling incentive and bundling strategy's impact on 
the incumbent broadband service provider. In addition, issues related to the 
access charges for the bottleneck facilities, such as the impact of the access 
charges on the total social welfare, as well as the level of the socially optimal 
access charge, have been explored. 
If the market's total valuation for the broadband internet service is 
sufficiently high, the market will be fully covered. In this case, both the 
entrant and the incumbent reflect the amount of the access charge onto the 
service price in order to maximize their profits. As a result, the entrant's 
bundling incentive is determined independently of the level of access 
charge. 
With more differentiation between services provided by the entrant and 
that of incumbent, the entrant cable TV service provider has a higher 
incentive to offer bundled service. This entrance by the cable TV provider 
lowers the profitability of the incumbent internet service provider, given a 
fixed level of access charge. 
In addition, a change in the level of access charge does not influence the 
size of the total social welfare. An increase in the access charge decreases 
the total consumers' surplus; however, it also increases the profit of the 
incumbent service provider with ownership of the essential facilities. Since a 
rise in the access charge does not affect the entrant's profit and the total 
social surplus, these counter-intuitive results may become the grounds for 
advocates in favor of imposition of a high access charge. On the other hand, 
the level of the access charge redistributes the net surplus between the 
incumbent and the consumers. Therefore, the determination of an 
appropriate level of access charge depends on the judgment of policy 
makers. 
When the market is not fully covered, because of the market's low 
valuation of the broadband internet service, the results are quite different. 
The entrant's profit decreases as the access charge increases, which 
directly affects the bundling incentive of the potential entrant. In this case, 
the entrant has a bundling incentive when the access charge is sufficiently 
low. A consequence of the entrant's bundling strategy is that the incumbent's 
profit increases if the access charge is set above the cost. 
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Under partial market coverage, the welfare maximizing level of the 
access charge is below the access provisioning cost. One might interpret the 
difference between the access provisioining cost and the welfare maximizing 
leve of access charge as a social subsidy. Since it is unrealistic to set the 
access charge below its cost, the access charge needs to be determined at 
the provisioning cost while the differential might be subsidized as a policy 
initiative. Furthermore, in contrast to the full market coverage case, these 
results may support the entrant's argument against an increase in the level 
of access charge. 
As a more recent example, the VoIP service poses an issue that shares a 
similar structure to that depicted by competition in the broadband internet 
service market. A large telco typically generates nearly a third of revenue 
through the access charges, according to the California Public Utilities 
Commision. In this situation, whether the VoIP service is classified as a 
telephone service or as an information service dramatically changes future 
profitability of VoIP service providers, including cable TV companies and 
telcos. In early 2004, as a response to requests from activist groups related 
to the Free World Dialup VoIP service, the FCC in the USA made a 
temporary ruling that VoIP is essentially an information service and not a 
telephone service, and thereby will not bear a regulatory burden (FCC, 
2004). In this case, any cable TV companies entering the telephony market 
via a bundled service of VoIP and cable TV will be exempt from the access 
charge imposition, thereby dramatically increasing their cost 
competitiveness. However, shortly after making this decision, the FCC 
initiated a more fundamental examination of the identity of VoIP in response 
to arguments for regulating VoIP by telcos. The initial findings of the FCC 
stated that internet telephony services that do not touch the PSTN are 
information services and will not be charged access fees, but will be subject 
to social obligations. Nevertheless, under neither scenario are VoIP 
providers completely free from fees. They are subject to reciprocal 
compensation fees in return for local interconnection (SHIN, 2006). As 
another force affecting the outlook of access chage regulation in VOIP 
market, the Intercarrier Compensation Forum consisting of AT&T corp., 
Level 3 Communications Inc., SBC Communications Inc. and a number of 
other telcos, submitted a proposal to the FCC to move towards a unified 
payment structure and the abolition of fees in 2011. However, Verizon 
Communications Inc. and BellSouth Corp. subsequently retreated from this 
movement, complicating the future course of this issue even futher. 
Nevertheless, VoIP market players seem to agree that the access charge 
issue is central to the future course of this market as the following remark by 
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Tony Clark, president of the North Dakota Public Service Commision, 
illustrates: "Really, the VoIP problem is an intercarrier compensation 
problem more than anything. If you can solve that problem, a lot of the other 
problems with VoIP go away." (LONG, 2004). 
As another example, the IPTV market poses issues that can be 
addressed by the framework of this paper. In 1998 and 1999, AT&T corp. 
aggressively acquired cable TV companies such as TCI and Media One, in 
anticipation of using their networks to launch a bundled telephony and IPTV 
service, thereby competing with cable TV companies. One of the major 
predicted benefits of these actions was the avoidance of the huge access 
charges AT&T would have had to pay the local access network owner for the 
IPTV service. However, the unforeseen technological hurdle of converting 
the one-way network into the two-way communications network at the time 
forced AT&T to drop its attempt to pursue the IPTV service. The U.S. telcos 
that have launched IPTV services more recently, such as Verizon 
communications Inc. and SBC Communicatinos Inc., have bypassed the 
access charge issue since they own local loop facilities (Emerging 
Technology Report, 2006). 
In the aforementioned examples of VoIP and IPTV markets, cable TV 
providers and telcos alternately took the roles of the entrant and the 
incumbent where the entrant tries to compete in the incumbent's market by 
bundling its own service. Moreover, the market force and regulatory 
guidance on the access charge is critical to each player's viability in both 
scenarios.  
Given this importance of access charges to market performance, the 
distinction between full and partial market coverage cases can serve as a 
useful benchmark for policy makers. In cases of service bundling with 
access charges as described in this paper, the policy alternative is two-fold: 
1) whether to allow the new service provider to bundle by entering a new 
market and 2) at what level the access charge should be imposed on the 
incumbent. With regard to the first alternative, trends towards liberalization in 
the telecommunications market, as well as recent trends towards digital 
convergence, have tended to favour the tolerance of bundling strategies for 
players entering a new market in most developed countries. In the USA, the 
FCC has been very supportive of cross entrance by cable TV and telcos into 
each other's market since the Communications Act of 1996. The 
Communication Act of 2003 in the U.K. initiated the launch of Ofcom, which 
now regulates both the broadcasting and telecommunications industries in 
anticipation of the launch of these convergence services (LIM, 2004). In 
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additon, Korean and Japanese policy initiatives have dramatically lowered 
barriers in broadcasting to telecommunications and telecommunications to 
broadcasting entrances. Specifically, the Japanese Ministry of Internal 
Affairs and Communications is considering launching an integrated 
department that is in charge of both broadcasting and telecommunications 
sectors together, partly for the purpose of supporting these convergence 
services (SHIN, 2004). As a result, convergence services such as VoIP and 
IPTV have been either launched or are being prepared in all of these 
countries.  
In this environment, policy makers' influence normally foucuses more on 
the determination of the level of access charge. As discussed in the 
Introduction section, the determination of the level of access charge 
influences the resulting market outlook. However, as illustrated throughout 
this paper, the role and influence of the access charge differs dramatically 
between full and partial market coverage cases. When it is expected that 
potential demand for the service is very high so that full market coverage is 
anticipated, factors such as service differentiation only affect the bundling 
incentive of the entrant, without affecting the total level of social welfare. In 
this case, since the level of access charge only redistributes surplus 
between the incumbent and consumers, the policy maker needs to set the 
level of access charge depending on which party it deems to receive more 
share. On the other hand, when it is expected that there is not enough 
demand for the service to support both firms, the welfare maximizing level of 
access charge is below the cost of provisioining it. In this case, a clear 
guidance and a possible subsidy policy need to be initiated by the policy 
maker. 
This paper points to at least two directions of further study. Firstly, this 
paper considers a single-period duopoly model. A multi-period competition 
model would be desirable in the following context. When the market is not 
fully covered, the access charge for the bottleneck facilities needs to be 
determined at the cost of provisioning it. If we consider further investment 
costs for the bottleneck facilities, such as the cost of a network upgrade, and 
the incorporation of new technologies by the incumbent, different results 
might arise. A multi-period analysis might be suitable for analyzing such 
context. 
Secondly, the entrance of the cable TV player into the broadband internet 
service market is only one example in an environment where the trend 
toward convergence is accelerating, as exemplified at the beginning of this 
paper. As the network infrastructure becomes increasingly versatile and 
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intelligent, cross-entrance by media and telecommunications firms into one 
another's domain will surely occur. The convergence and competition 
between wired and wireless networks is another example of this 
convergence trend. In many possible scenarios of the convergence trend, 
the combination of the cross entrance model and the access charge model 
can address the issues of bundling incentives, service pricing, profitability, 
and access charge determination. A partial list of additional important factors 
for such analyses would include the installed base of each service, the 
extent of network externalities, the extent of service differentiation, and the 
first-mover advantage of the incumbent. 
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